Canada Gazette, Part I, Volume 155, Number 25: Regulations Amending the Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012 (Various Amendments)

June 19, 2021

Statutory authority
Aeronautics Act

Sponsoring department
Department of Transport

REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS STATEMENT

(This statement is not part of the regulations.)

Executive summary

Issues

As the aviation industry works to restore the public's confidence and the safety of air travel during the recovery phase of the COVID-19 pandemic and the aviation landscape continues to evolve, regulatory amendments are needed to address aviation security stakeholder irritants and regulatory discrepancies related to RAICs and locked checked baggage; better align identity screening requirements with the Secure Air Travel Regulations to harmonize the verification of identity documents; clarify that the identity verification system is a CATSA screening function; and ensure that Canada continues to meet international obligations by establishing requirements for a security program and standards for screening officer training, certification and instructor qualifications.

Background

Security screening is an important element in ensuring the security of the air transportation system. CATSA was established in 2002 to take actions, either directly or through a screening contractor, for the effective and efficient screening of persons who access aircraft or restricted areas through screening checkpoints, the goods in their possession or control, and the baggage they give to an air carrier for transport. Security screening requirements are regulated through the Aeronautics Act, the Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012 (CASR 2012) and various security measures made pursuant to section 4.72 of the Aeronautics Act.

CATSA is a Crown corporation responsible for conducting screening in the following four areas at Canada's designated airports or any other place, including any other aerodrome, designated by the Minister:

1. Pre-board screening of passengers and their belongings;
2. Hold baggage screening of passengers' checked baggage;
3. Non-passenger screening of airport workers and their belongings; and
4. RAIC program where CATSA manages a secure biometric identity verification program that prevents unauthorized persons from accessing restricted areas of airports.

The CATSA Aerodrome Designation Regulations include a list of designated aerodromes where CATSA is mandated to provide these security screening services.

The various issues described in this section have been grouped together under three themes that the proposed regulations would address improving efficiencies, quality control and international standards.

Improving efficiencies

Stakeholders have identified some inefficiencies related to existing requirements and processes.

Locked checked baggage

Under subsection 4.71(2)(d) of the Aeronautics Act, the Governor in Council may make regulations authorizing the use of force to gain access to goods that are intended to be taken or placed on board an aircraft. CATSA screens all checked baggage with X-ray equipment before it is placed on an aircraft. During the screening process, X-ray equipment is used to identify suspicious items. If additional screening is required, CATSA is able to search inside a bag if the bag is not locked or if it is locked with an approved lock that CATSA can unlock using special tools and then re-lock to secure the bag. If a bag is locked with a lock that CATSA cannot unlock, or if the bag is sealed with a cable tie or plastic wrap, CATSA must contact the airline. Under the existing regulatory framework, only air carriers can use force to gain access to goods that are intended to be taken or placed on board an aircraft. Air carriers become legally responsible for the care and control of checked baggage once they are presented to them for transport. An airline representative will then either cut the lock or seal so CATSA can search the inside of the bag or hold the bag at the departure airport until the passenger returns. This current process is inefficient as CATSA must wait until the air carrier is available to cut the lock or seal. Furthermore, if there is a delay with the airline representative reaching CATSA, a traveller may go to their destination without their bag.

During the 2018–19 fiscal year, air carrier representatives were called to cut locks on almost 250 000 pieces of checked baggage. Air carriers have raised concerns with the costs associated with having to perform this task and have requested that it be transferred to CATSA. CATSA agrees that it would be more efficient for screening officers to perform this task, but a legal authority is required before CATSA can assume this responsibility.

Restricted area identity card

A restricted area identity card (RAIC) is a pass issued by the operator of an aerodrome that can be biometrically verified by the identity verification system to validate the identity of the RAIC holder and confirm that the card holder is permitted to access the restricted area. The CASR 2012 identify the information that must be printed on a RAIC, which includes the person's name and height, the card's expiry date, the name of the aerodrome where the card was issued, the name of the person's employer, and the person's occupation. When information on the card changes, a new card must be printed and the old card destroyed.

Operators have voiced their concerns over the costs associated with printing a new RAIC each time the information changes. To address this issue and reduce the number of cards that must be printed, airports have asked if some of the non-security related information could be removed from the RAIC. More specifically, it is being proposed that the following be removed: a person's height, their occupation, and the term “multi-occupation” when the person has more than one occupation. The requirement to include a person's height on a RAIC was introduced in 2006 to replicate what was in place for the Airport Restricted Area Pass Program. Maintaining this information on a RAIC was intended to facilitate the transfer to the new RAIC program. Today, the identity of a person and their access to a restricted area is determined by their biometrics (e.g. iris or fingerprint scan). With the use of biometrics, a person's height is no longer a relevant indicator for access control.

The requirement to include a person's occupation on a RAIC was necessary to satisfy some of the record-keeping requirements of the non-passenger screening program. From 2006 to 2014, CATSA was required to record a person's occupation when a person selected for screening entered the restricted area without undergoing security screening. When the non-passenger screening program was enhanced in 2014, access control using the identity verification system became a requirement at each screening checkpoint. Because the information about a person's occupation is stored in the identity verification system, it no longer needs to be printed on the RAIC.

A second concern is related to a RAIC that is issued for use at multiple airports. The multi-airport RAIC is only valid for one year, whereas a single-airport RAIC is valid for up to five years. When multi-airport RAICs were first introduced, there were concerns because the access control system was still new, so airports and TC decided that the validity period would be set at one year as a trial. Once it became clear that a person's access could easily be controlled or even cancelled when a security clearance is revoked, airports petitioned TC to increase the validity period to five years, which would reduce the burden of printing these cards each year.

Quality control

Transport Canada has identified some discrepancies between the changing aviation landscape and the regulatory framework, which has not kept pace with those changes.

For example, the existing definition of “screening authority” refers to a person who is responsible for screening persons and goods; however, it does not specifically refer to CATSA or another screening contractor as authorized in the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority Act. A definition that specifically identifies CATSA or another authorized contractor would ensure greater clarity and certainty about who is responsible for screening.

A provision in the CASR 2012 currently prohibits sharp or cutting instruments included in medical kits from passing beyond a screening checkpoint. In 2017, TC amended the Prohibited Items List to remove the prohibition on small knives because they were deemed to be low risk. Removing small knives from the list allowed CATSA to focus its resources on finding complex, artfully concealed or higher-risk items. As small knives have been removed from the Prohibited Items List, the provision that prohibits sharp or cutting instruments in medical kits can be removed from the CASR 2012.

The CASR 2012 require the operator of an aerodrome to retrieve RAICs that have been deactivated. Deactivation occurs when a cardholder is no longer employed at the aerodrome or when a security clearance is suspended or revoked. Operators of aerodromes that have a RAIC program currently destroy these cards and maintain records as part of the administration of the program, but there is no regulated requirement to do so.

Some of the identity requirements in the CASR 2012 do not align with the recently modified Secure Air Travel Regulations. The CASR 2012 do not expressly prevent a person from presenting invalid identity documents, such as expired government-issued identification and documents issued for fishing, hunting or boating.

Current identity screening regulations require the verification of a person's name, date of birth and gender. The CASR 2012 prevent persons from going beyond a screening checkpoint if they do not appear to be the age and gender indicated on their identification document. This subjective assessment made by a screening officer could disproportionately impact gender-diverse people if they have identity documents that do not match their lived gender.

Identity screening involves comparing the information on an identification document with the person at a screening checkpoint. Currently, the CASR 2012 allow CATSA to determine when identity screening occurs. This means that CATSA is not expressly required to follow direction from the Minister about when to conduct identity screening. As it is the Minister who is responsible for aviation security under the Aeronautics Act, it should be the Minister, officially, who determines when, and sets the conditions under which, identity screening occurs.

When CATSA wants to test, modify or add new screening equipment or software, it follows an existing process that was established in accordance with a Memorandum of Understanding with TC. However, a Memorandum of Understanding is an administrative agreement; it is not legally binding. Therefore, the Minister's authority is limited to ensure that changes to screening equipment and software are carried out in a consistent manner and subject to consistent oversight and scrutiny.

Business continuity plans are implemented by CATSA when it discovers that it is unable to use the identity verification system and by the operator of an aerodrome when it is unable to use its restricted area access control process. In both situations, the Minister must be notified. The CASR 2012 do not specify a time frame for this notification to occur, which has resulted in TC not being notified until well after the business continuity plans are implemented. This delayed notification means that aviation security inspectors cannot be involved from the outset nor can they determine if business continuity plans are properly executed.

When the identity verification system was first introduced in 2006, it was considered a security function. The system was initially put in place to meet international standards related to controlling access to restricted areas. When the non-passenger screening program was enhanced in 2014, the use of the identity verification system to verify a person's identity through biometrics became more widespread at Canada's designated airports. Part of CATSA's mandate is to conduct screening of non-passengers who access restricted areas. Along with these enhancements, persons are only permitted to enter the restricted area at an access point where security screening and identity verification are carried out. The use of the identity verification system has become an extension of the screening process, as a person cannot enter the restricted area without having their identity verified.

The CASR 2012 incorrectly identify that the identity verification system is a security function that is not considered to be screening. In order to clarify that this screening function aligns with CATSA's mandate, it would be moved from Part 2 to Part 1 of the CASR 2012.

The airports listed in the schedule of the CATSA Aerodrome Designation Regulations are missing the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) alphanumeric location indicators that designate each airport around the world (e.g. YOW for Ottawa and YUL for Montréal). Furthermore, some airport names in the schedules of the CATSA Aerodrome Designation Regulations and the CASR 2012 do not align. For example, one regulation says Toronto (City Centre) while the other says Toronto (Billy Bishop Toronto City), and one regulation says Cranbrook while the other says Cranbrook (Canadian Rockies International).

International standards

Canada is a Member State of ICAO and has an effective and internationally respected civil aviation security program. Canada is committed to aligning its domestic policy and regulations with the ICAO standards and recommended best practices to ensure the security and safety of Canada's aviation system. Continuing these efforts solidifies Canada's reputation as a respected member of ICAO and demonstrates Canada's commitment to the safety and security of the aviation system.

Security program

ICAO calls on Member States in Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation to set security program requirements for the aviation industry to establish, implement and maintain written security programs. Security programs strengthen the entire aviation security system by promoting a more comprehensive, coordinated and integrated approach throughout the industry. The evolving and adaptive nature of aviation security threats requires a modern aviation security regulatory framework to enable a more prepared and risk-based approach. While Canada has established security program requirements for airports, it has not yet established formal security program requirements for CATSA. The proposed regulatory amendments would require CATSA to meet security program requirements, most of which are already met through an existing CATSA security management framework.

Training, certification and qualification

ICAO calls on Member States in Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation to formally establish standards for the training and certification of screening officers and qualification standards for instructors who provide training to screening officers. Although CATSA maintains effective standards, these requirements are not currently set in regulations.

Designated provisions

The proposal includes amending the designated provisions of the CASR 2012 in order to provide for the imposition of administrative monetary penalties as a means to enforce the CASR 2012. Historically, monetary penalties have proven to be an effective method to achieve regulatory compliance and are typically used as a last resort after all other options have been exhausted.

The Aeronautics Act provides that enforcement actions could be taken in the form of administrative monetary penalties pursuant to sections 7.6 to 8.2, and charges could be laid for the commission of an offence set out under subsection 7.3(3). Penalties are an effective and tangible way for TC to respond to non-compliance through an administrative process rather than a court hearing.

Under the Aeronautics Act, the maximum monetary penalty that can be assessed for the contravention of a designated provision is $5,000 for individuals and $25,000 for corporations.

Objective

The objective of this regulatory proposal is to improve efficiencies by providing aviation security stakeholders with relief from long-standing irritants, enabling CATSA to continue to effectively carry out its security screening mandate, strengthening the regulatory framework by addressing discrepancies and formalizing existing procedures, and meeting international standards and best practices.

Description

Improving efficiencies

Locked checked baggage

The proposed amendments would transfer the responsibility for cutting locks and seals on checked baggage from air carriers to CATSA. This would save time by removing air carriers from the process and would result in cost savings for air carriers.

The proposed amendments would

• authorize CATSA, rather than an air carrier, to cut locks and seals on checked bags that must be opened and searched for the purposes of aviation security screening;
• require CATSA to notify the person who tendered the baggage that it used force to gain access to the checked baggage; and
• require CATSA to keep a record of each instance when force is used to gain access to the contents of checked baggage.

Restricted area identity card (RAIC)

To reduce the cost of printing and issuing new cards, proposed amendments to the CASR 2012 would ensure that only the information that is necessary and required for airport operations be displayed on a card.

The proposed amendments would remove the following information from a RAIC:

• A person's height; and
• A person's occupation if the person has a single occupation, or the term “multi-occupation” if the person has more than one occupation.

All the other information would continue to be displayed on the card, including the person's employer. The person's employer and occupation would continue to be recorded when the person applies for a transportation security clearance, a prerequisite to obtaining a RAIC. Removing the information from the RAIC would not have any negative day-to-day impacts on operations for cardholders, CATSA or airports because biometrics would remain the primary validation tool to verify a RAIC holder's identity.

The proposed amendments would also change the validity period of a multi-airport RAIC from one year to five years to align with the validity period of a single airport RAIC.

Quality control

The following summarizes the amendments that are being proposed to update and clarify definitions and requirements, formalize existing procedures, align the schedules in two regulations, align identity requirements with those that were recently modified in the Secure Air Travel Regulations, and assert the Minister's oversight role over identity screening and when screening equipment and software are tested or modified.

Update and clarify definitions and requirements, and formalize existing procedures

• Amend the definition for “screening authority” to identify that it means, as the context requires, CATSA, a screening contractor or a screening officer;
• Repeal the provision that prohibits sharp or cutting instruments in medical kits to align with the Prohibited Items List that allows small knives;
• Codify into regulations existing procedures by which operators of aerodromes destroy RAICs that have been retrieved or returned to them;
• Transfer the requirement to keep a record of RAICs that have been destroyed from CATSA to the operator of an aerodrome;
• Move the identity verification system requirements that support the RAIC program from Part 2 to Part 1 to clarify that they are part of a screening service that falls under CATSA's mandate;
• Clarify that when CATSA implements its business continuity plan for the identity verification system, it must immediately notify the Minister; and
• Clarify that when the operator of an aerodrome implements its business continuity plan for its access control system, it must immediately notify the Minister and CATSA.

Align schedules

The proposed amendments would update and align the schedules of the CASR 2012 and the CATSA Aerodrome Designation Regulations to remove the name of the airport and replace it with the name of the city as well as include the ICAO alphanumeric location indicator for each airport.

Align identity requirements in the CASR 2012 with the Secure Air Travel Regulations

The proposed amendments would specify that government-issued identification must be valid and that a document issued by a government for the purpose of fishing, hunting or boating is not acceptable identification.

The proposed amendments would also remove all references to gender for the purpose of identity screening, because gender will no longer be used to verify identity. This amendment would align with the spirit of the Policy Direction to Modernize the Government of Canada's Sex and Gender Information Practices, in which one of the objectives is to promote the respect, inclusion and personal safety of transgender, non-binary and two-spirit individuals. Removing gender from the identity screening requirements would not weaken the integrity of the identity screening program nor is it expected to have an impact on security because other requirements used to confirm a person's identity (e.g. name and resemblance to photo) would remain unchanged.

Similarly, the proposed amendments would remove the obligation for CATSA to deny a person from passing beyond a passenger screening checkpoint if the person does not appear to be the age indicated by the date of birth indicated on their identification document, as age will no longer be used to verify identity.

Assert the Minister of Transport's oversight role over identity screening and screening equipment

The proposed amendments would specify that identity screening would be carried out for the purpose of aviation security in accordance with a security measure, an emergency direction or an interim order that would be determined by the Minister. Currently, identity screening occurs if there is a heightened risk condition that can be mitigated by screening the identity of certain persons at the checkpoint. While there is currently no intention to change the specific conditions for identity screening, the proposed amendments would ensure that any future changes to those conditions would be made by the Minister.

The proposed amendments would also prescribe that CATSA implement and maintain a minister-approved process to obtain the Minister's approval before testing, modifying or adding new screening equipment or software. CATSA would be required to provide the Minister with a description and reason for the request, supporting documentation from the equipment or software manufacturer, information about the performance verification tools that would be used, and documentation demonstrating that the detection performance of any modified equipment is maintained or enhanced. These amendments would help to ensure that changes to screening equipment and software are carried out consistently and subject to the oversight and scrutiny of the Minister.

In addition, the proposed amendments would prescribe that CATSA must implement and maintain a Minister approved process for the disposal of screening equipment and software to ensure consistency and to prevent the unintentional disclosure of sensitive information.

International standards

Canada endeavours to align its domestic policy and regulations with the established international standards, guidance and recommended best practices determined by ICAO. The proposed amendments related to security program requirements align with what ICAO has determined to be key components of a security management system. The amendments that would introduce standards for screening officer training and certification align with ICAO's recommendations for officer recruitment, selection and training.

Internationally, the United States, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom have legislated training program requirements that align with ICAO's recommendations. Canada's international partners have also established security program requirements that apply to their aviation security stakeholders. Their requirements represent a layered approach to meeting ICAO's national civil aviation security program standards.

The proposed amendments would add requirements for a security program and introduce standards for screening officer training and certification.

Security program

An aviation security program builds capacity to respond to emerging or unforeseen aviation security threats and risks and is intended to help an organization manage and support aviation security in a way that is comprehensive, integrated, coordinated and risk based. The proposed regulatory amendments would require CATSA to meet security program requirements, most of which are already met through an existing CATSA security management framework. CATSA would be required to establish and implement a written security program to safeguard its information, equipment, information technology infrastructure, facilities and all other assets related to screening operations. CATSA would also be required to assess risk information and disseminate it within its organization and with the Minister of Transport. As part of the security program, the proposed amendments would require CATSA to

• Develop and communicate a security policy statement that establishes an overall commitment and direction and sets out security objectives;
• Establish and implement a security awareness program for its employees and screening contractors that promotes a culture of security vigilance and awareness;
• Assess and disseminate risk information within its organization for the purpose of informed decision-making;
• Identify a security official who is the principle contact between CATSA and the Minister regarding the security program;
• Require CATSA to be a member of the multi-agency advisory committee at airports;
• Establish and implement a process for receiving, identifying, retaining, disclosing and disposing of sensitive information respecting aviation security in order to safeguard information and to protect it from unauthorized access;
• Establish and implement a process for responding to security incidents and breaches;
• Conduct a security risk assessment (reviewed at least once a year) that would include
  • A threat assessment to evaluate the probability of a disruption to aviation security screening services caused by unauthorized access or an act or attempted act of unlawful interference,
  • A criticality assessment to prioritize the information, equipment, information technology infrastructure, facilities and all other assets related to its screening operations that must require protection from acts and attempted acts of unlawful interference,
  • A vulnerability assessment that considers the extent to which its information, equipment, information technology infrastructure, facilities and all other assets related to its screening operations are susceptible to loss or damage, and
  • An impact assessment that measures the consequences of a security screening incident or potential security screening incident in terms of
    • a decrease in public safety and security,
    • financial and economic loss, and
    • a loss of public confidence;
• Submit, for the Minister's approval, the initial security risk assessment and a new one within five years after the date of the most recent approval;
• Document any decision to amend or not to amend the risk assessment or risk-management strategy, the reasons for that decision and the factors that were taken into consideration when making that decision;
• Establish and submit, for approval by the Minister, a strategic security plan that would
  • summarize a strategy to prepare for, detect, prevent, respond to and recover from threats identified in the security risk assessment, and
  • include a risk-management strategy that addresses the medium to high security risks identified and prioritized in its security risk assessment;
• Document the reason for amendments made to the strategic plan and provide the plan to the Minister for approval;
• Keep documents related to its security risk assessment and strategic security plan and any review or amendments to them for at least five years;
• Keep all other documents related to its security program for at least two years; and
• Make documents available to the Minister on reasonable notice given by the Minister.

Training, certification and qualification

The proposed amendments would replace the Designation Standards for Screening Officers, which are currently incorporated by reference in the CASR 2012, with new training requirements set out directly in the Regulations that align with CATSA's current training program. These proposed amendments would

• Require CATSA to establish and implement a training program for screening officers that includes theoretical, practical and evaluation components, as well as an ongoing training program that includes an evaluation component, where screening officers can maintain their expertise and continue to learn;
• Require CATSA to provide its training program to the Minister upon request;
• Ensure that records are kept on screening officer training and certification, and make them available to the Minister upon request;
• Introduce minimum certification and decertification standards that CATSA would be required to meet when training, assessing and certifying screening officers;
• Require CATSA to establish remedial measures that include an evaluation when screening officers are unable to carry out their screening duties effectively;
• Require CATSA to implement a process that includes an evaluation for screening officers who are absent from work for extended periods of time; and
• Introduce qualification requirements for instructors who provide training to screening officers.

Amendments to the designated provisions

The designated provisions identified in Schedule 4 of the CASR 2012 are made pursuant to paragraph 7.6(1)(b) of the Aeronautics Act. This allows the Minister to impose monetary penalties for the contravention of designated provisions and helps ensure that affected stakeholders comply with the regulated requirements.

Amendments would be needed to Schedule 4 to add designated provisions for new requirements. More than half of the designated provisions would be for the new security program requirements and the remaining provisions would be for screening officer qualifications, certifications, training and examination; instructor qualifications; CATSA's authority to use force to open checked bags that are locked or sealed; and for screening equipment and software that are new, tested or modified.

Regulatory development

Consultation

Transport Canada was approached by air carriers with a request to transfer the responsibility for cutting locks and seals on checked baggage from air carriers to CATSA. Initial consultations were held with aviation security stakeholders at the Security Screening Technical Committee and the Advisory Group on Aviation Security where airports, air carriers and CATSA are represented. CATSA determined that this change would benefit the screening process because CATSA screening officers would not have to wait for an air carrier representative to cut a lock or a seal. Although this change in responsibility would have no negative impact on passengers, TC launched a public consultation in June of 2019 to be open and transparent about its proposal. Transport Canada's “Let's Talk Transportation” website was used to propose the amendments and solicit feedback. Overall, the feedback was positive with industry stakeholders and the public indicating support for the proposed changes.

In a letter, TC was asked by the Canadian Airports Council (CAC) to align the validity period of a multi-airport RAIC with the validity period of a standard RAIC. In 2018, during a review of the non-passenger screening program, working group members proposed the removal of non-security-related information from the RAIC to reduce the number of cards that must be printed. Following a review of the RAIC regulations and consulting with CATSA, it was determined that further modifications could be made to better align the regulations with today's operations. Therefore, TC consulted with the CAC to determine the impact on airports if they were regulated to destroy RAICs and keep records of RAICs that are destroyed. After consulting with the affected airports, the CAC reported that airports are already destroying RAICs that are returned to them and keeping a record of them. Consequently, the proposed amendments would have no impact on airports.

For the amendments that would introduce screening officer training and certification standards and new requirements to establish and implement a security program, TC worked closely with CATSA throughout 2019. Both determined that the requirements for training and certification would formalize CATSA existing procedures and, as such, would have no impact on CATSA.

Transport Canada has been discussing security program requirements with aviation security stakeholders for several years through various consultation forums including the Advisory Group on Aviation Security. Adding security program requirements that focus on safeguarding information, equipment, information technology infrastructure, facilities and all other assets related to screening operations would strengthen CATSA's existing security management framework.

COVID-19 pandemic

While the COVID-19 pandemic has severely impacted the aviation industry and CATSA has had to focus on adapting its screening operations to the pandemic environment, CATSA has continued to work closely with TC in order to prepare itself to meet the new requirements established in the proposed amendments. CATSA has not raised concerns about the pandemic negatively affecting its ability to implement the proposed Regulations. Furthermore, many of CATSA's current processes already meet several of the proposed requirements.

Modern treaty obligations and Indigenous engagement and consultation

In accordance with the Cabinet Directive on the Federal Approach to Modern Treaty Implementation, TC completed an assessment of modern treaty implications. No impacts on modern treaties have been identified. Likewise, the proposed amendments are not expected to have a disproportionate impact on Indigenous groups.

Instrument choice

Regulatory amendments are needed to address existing requirements and align Canada's regulations with international standards and best practices. Non-regulatory options would not be sufficient, as the existing requirements would remain in place. For example, without regulatory amendments, airlines — as opposed to CATSA —would continue to be responsible for cutting locks and seals on checked baggage. Likewise, requirements for RAICs would remain unchanged. Similarly, non-regulatory options would not be sufficient to ensure that international standards related to security programs and officer qualifications are consistently adopted and enforced. Therefore, non-regulatory options were not considered.

Regulatory analysis

The proposed amendments aim to ensure that CATSA continues to effectively carry out its security screening mandate, meet international obligations and increase efficiency for aviation security stakeholders. The proposed amendments would result in an incremental cost of $775,245 to CATSA and $5,054 to the Government of Canada, for a total present value cost of $780,299. In addition, the proposed amendments would benefit operators of aerodromes and air carriers by improving inefficiencies from persisting irritants. The proposed amendments are expected to result in a cost savings of $18.59 million to air carriers and $2.37 million in savings to aerodrome operators, for a total present value cost savings of $20.96 million.

Analytical framework

The costs and benefits for the proposed amendments have been assessed in accordance with the Policy on Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS). Where possible, impacts are quantified and monetized, with only the direct costs and benefits for stakeholders being considered in the cost-benefit analysis.

Benefits and costs associated with the proposed amendments are assessed based on comparing the baseline against the regulatory scenarios. The baseline scenario depicts what is likely to happen in the future if the Government of Canada does not implement the proposed amendments. The regulatory scenario provides information on the intended outcomes as a result of the proposed amendments.

The analysis estimated the impact of the proposed amendments over a 15-year period from 2021 to 2035, with the year 2021 being when the final regulations are registered. The 15-year period is used to capture the costs associated with the security program that would be realized after 2022. Unless otherwise stated, all costs are expressed in present value 2019 Canadian dollars, discounted to 2020 at a 7% discount rate.

Affected stakeholders

The proposed amendments would affect CATSA, Canadian operators of aerodromes, air carriers and the Government of Canada. CATSA and the Government of Canada would bear the costs of the proposed amendments, with a majority of the costs assumed by CATSA. The proposed amendments are expected to result in cost savings to operators of aerodromes and air carriers.

CATSA is mandated to provide security screening services at 89 designated airports. Air carriers operating in these designated airports would yield cost savings due to more efficient procedures related to cutting locks and seals on locked baggage. Further, operators of aerodromes that issue RAICs for the identity verification system would yield cost savings by removing some of the information that needs to be printed on RAICs and the increased validity period for multi-airport RAICs.

Baseline and regulatory scenarios

In the baseline scenario, CATSA would be required to call air carriers to cut locks and seals that CATSA is unauthorized to cut. Operators of aerodromes would be required to print RAICs whenever the information on a RAIC changes, as well as reprinting multi-aerodrome RAICs every year. Lastly, requirements to the security program and standards for screening officer training and certification would not be consistent with international standards or best practices. In addition, the proposed Regulations would require CATSA to develop a security program that includes a security awareness program, an annual risk assessment (as well as an initial risk assessment), a strategic security plan and a process to respond to security incidents. No such activities required under the proposed Regulations are undertaken in the baseline.

In the regulatory scenario, the proposed amendments would introduce more efficient procedures for cutting locks and seals on locked baggage and printing RAICs. The responsibility for cutting locks and seals on locked baggage would be transferred from air carriers to CATSA, eliminating the need for air carriers to be called. The proposed amendments would remove some of the information that needs to be included on a RAIC, which is expected to result in fewer and less frequent reprints. In addition, the validity period for multi-aerodrome RAICs would be extended from one year to five years. Further, the proposed amendments would update and clarify definitions, references and requirements to the regulatory framework, as well as safeguard TC's role in regulatory and oversight of aviation security. Lastly, the proposed amendments would align the security program and screening officer standards with international standards and best practices which would strengthen Canada's position on a global scale.

Benefits and costs

In total, the proposed amendments would result in a cost savings of $20.96 million, of which $18.59 million would be realized by air carriers and $2.37 million by operators of aerodromes. The proposed amendments would result in a total incremental cost of $775,245 to CATSA. The costs to CATSA are broken down as follows:

• $259,802 associated with training CATSA screening officers who would be responsible for cutting locks and seals on checked baggage;
• $418,505^{footnote 1} to purchasing toolkits, toolboxes and protective equipment (goggles and gloves) associated with locked checked baggage requirements;
• $96,180 related to implementing security program requirements and training standards to meet international standards and best practices; and
• $758 in administrative costs to prepare documents for TC's approval when CATSA wants to test, modify, add or dispose of screening equipment and software.

In addition, a cost of $5,054 would be assumed by the Government for approving and reviewing documents sent from CATSA in relation to these new requirements. The total cost of the proposed amendments would be $780,299.

Benefits

The proposed amendments are expected to improve the overall efficiency of checked baggage screening and reducing the financial impact of aviation irritants on operators of aerodromes and air carriers. The proposed amendments would result in a cost savings of $20.96 million to operators of aerodromes and air carriers.

Improving efficiencies

Locked checked baggage

The proposed amendments would transfer the responsibility of cutting locks and seals on checked baggage from air carriers to CATSA, by giving CATSA explicit authority to use force when it is required for security screening purposes. This would result in a total cost savings of $18.59 million to air carriers over the 15-year analytical time frame.

Removing air carriers from the process would help reduce the time and employee presence previously required, which would result in cost savings for air carriers. In order to determine the impact of this change, the estimated number of checked bags is required. In order to determine the number of checked bags, the number of passengers and the number of checked bags between 2013 and 2018 are used to estimate the expected ratio of checked bags per passenger.

To estimate the forecasted number of passengers, the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic were incorporated into the analysis. The reduced operations are expected to lower the number of passengers and in turn the number of checked bags for 2021 and following years.

Before the COVID-19 pandemic, a median growth rate of passengers for different classes of aerodrome operators was calculated using the historical number of passengers between 2005 and 2018. More specifically, the average growth rate of passengers for international activities was estimated to be 0.025 per year, and that for domestic activities was 0.037 per year. These growth rates were then used to forecast the number of passengers for the next 15 years.

However, given the significant impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on passenger activity, this analysis uses new growth rates that integrate the sharp decline in activity and the industry's recovery. At this time, sources, such as the International Air Transport Association, Air Canada and industry analysts, have supported the hypothesis that a U-shaped recovery path will be followed. Under the U-shaped recovery path, there is a sharp decline in air passenger demand in 2020, which would then increase gradually over time and return to the pre-crisis level in 2030 for international air travel, and 2023 for domestic air travel. Beyond 2029, the growth rate of passenger demand would return to the pre-crisis forecast (i.e. 0.025 per year for international activities and 0.037 for domestic activities) trend line.

It is estimated that, on average, approximately 1.135 bags are carried per passenger. Taking the forecasted number of passengers and the ratio of checked bags per passenger, it is estimated that on average 103 million bags per annum would be checked in from 2021 to 2035. From historical checked bags data provided by TC's aviation security program, 1.6% of checked bags would require extra screening. Of those, 20% of checked bags would require locks to be cut. Based on stakeholder consultation with CATSA, 15 minutes are saved from the transfer of authority from air carriers to CATSA at an (ARCHIVED) average air carrier wage rate of $27.04 per hour. This results in a cost savings of $18.59 million to air carriers between 2021 and 2035.

The proposed amendments would result in an additional cost savings related to no longer needing to purchase and replace bolt cutters used to cut locks on locked checked bags. These cost savings were not monetized due to lack of information.

Restricted area identity card

The proposed amendments would limit the information displayed on a restricted area identity card (RAIC) to only the elements that are necessary and required for airport operations and, as a result, would reduce costs associated with the frequency of printing and issuing RAICs. In addition, the proposed amendments would extend the validity period of a multi-aerodrome RAIC from one year to five years, which would also reduce costs because fewer cards would need to be printed.

In 2019, there were approximately 132 500 active RAICs^{footnote 2} being used in Canada. Of those, 3 500 were multi-aerodrome RAICs. Based on stakeholder consultations with air carriers and historical data between 2007 and 2019, an annual growth rate of 2.2%^{footnote 3} is applied to active RAICs, and an annual internal employee turnover of 15% is assumed. Using this information, it is estimated that the proposed amendments would result in issuing an average of 27 960 fewer RAICs annually over the 15-year analytical time frame. Given a printing cost of $10.35^{footnote 4} per RAIC, the proposed amendments would result in cost savings of $2.37 million to operators of aerodromes.

Quality control

The proposed amendments ensure that CATSA fulfils its aviation security obligation in accordance with various regulatory requirements enacted under the Aeronautics Act, including the CASR 2012 and aviation security measures. Updating definitions, references, schedules and certain requirements would ensure that the rules are accurate and would provide greater clarity about the stakeholders' roles and responsibilities. Formalizing existing procedures into regulations would allow TC to carry out oversight activities and establish applicable designated provisions to ensure compliance. Better aligning identity screening requirements with the Secure Air Travel Regulations would ensure consistency with the spirit of the Policy Direction to Modernize the Government of Canada's Sex and Gender Information Practices, and passengers would no longer be prevented from going beyond the screening checkpoint if they do not appear to be the age and/or gender indicated on their identification document.

International standards

The proposed amendments would align Canada's domestic policy with ICAO standards and recommended best practices. Strengthening CATSA's existing security program requirements would build capacity to respond to emerging or unforeseen aviation security threats and risks. It would aid CATSA in managing aviation security in a way that is comprehensive, integrated, coordinated and risk-based. A formal security program would allow CATSA to be proactive in identifying threats and be more effective in providing rapid responses to mitigate threats to CATSA's information, equipment, information technology infrastructure, facilities and other assets related to screening operations. Advancing the aviation security regulatory framework would also strengthen Canada's influence and aviation regulatory expertise on the international stage.

Costs

The proposed amendments would result in total incremental costs of $780,299 over the 15-year analytical time frame, of which $775,245 would be assumed by CATSA and $5,054 would be assumed by the Government.

Improving efficiencies

Locked checked baggage

The proposed amendments would require CATSA to develop additional training and standard operating procedures for screening checked baggage. In addition, CATSA would be required to purchase toolkits, toolboxes and protective equipment to cut the locks on locked checked bags.

It is estimated that training would only be required for 20 to 25% of all CATSA screening officers as this represents the subset of screening officers that specialize in checked baggage screening. The costs associated with this training are broken down by the development cost, the initial opportunity cost and ongoing opportunity cost of new screening officers and retraining.

The short training session to inform screening officers about the added responsibility would be developed by CATSA internally and implemented within the existing screening officer training program. CATSA expects that the development of the training program would require 12 weeks of full-time work for five employees.^{footnote 5} The total cost for developing the training would be $84,611, which would be assumed in 2021.

The subset of screening officers that would be required to take the additional training would occur in 2021. While these officers are in training, they would not be able to perform screening tasks. As a result, the opportunity cost of training (or loss of productivity) is measured by their wage rates and the duration of training. In addition, it is expected that training costs for new certifications and retraining would occur annually beginning in 2021. The total opportunity cost of training would be $175,191 over the 15-year analytical time frame.

The cost of training related to locked checked baggage is estimated to be $259,802 between 2021 and 2035.

The proposed amendments would transfer the responsibility to purchase and replace tools to cut locks and seals on locked checked bags from air carriers to CATSA. The total cost of purchasing toolkits, toolboxes and protective equipment would be $418,505 over the 15-year analytical time frame.

In total, the cost to CATSA related to the locked checked baggage amendments is an estimated $678,307 between 2021 and 2035.

Quality control

Under the baseline scenario, CATSA has an established process for disposing of screening equipment and software. It also follows a lifecycle management plan where screening equipment is replaced at the end of its lifespan, which is every 10 years. The proposed amendments would require a Minister approved process for the disposal of screening equipment and software. For the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that this would happen in 2021 and 2031.

When CATSA wants to test, modify or add new screening equipment or software, it follows an existing Minister approved process that was established in a Memorandum of Understanding with TC. The proposed amendments would formalize the existing process in the Regulations.

It is expected that preparing and submitting documents for ministerial approval would result in costs of $758^{footnote 6} to CATSA and $798 to the Government for review and approval^{footnote 7} over the 15-year analytical time frame.

International standards

The proposed amendments would ensure that CATSA continues to meet international standards through an aviation security program and through the training and certification of screening officers. The majority of CATSA's current security management framework meets the aviation security program requirements. However, some changes would be required to align with the existing Airport Security Program requirements which would result in incremental costs to both CATSA and the Government. The results of the analysis are presented below.

Costs to CATSA — International standards

The total incremental cost of implementing the security program and administrative costs to CATSA is $96,180. A detailed breakdown of the costs follows.

Establishment of security program

CATSA would be required to establish and implement a security program to safeguard CATSA's information, equipment, information technology infrastructure, facilities and all other assets related to screening operations. CATSA would hire a consultant to develop and establish a security program which would include a security awareness program, risk assessment (including the initial risk assessment), strategic security plan, and a process to respond to security incidents. This cost was estimated at $200,000, undiscounted. Consultation with CATSA revealed that the one-time cost to hire a consultant would take place prior to the coming into force of the proposed amendments. As a consequence, this cost is not included in the analysis, as it will have been assumed before the proposed Regulations would come into force. Any benefits that could be attributed to the existence of the program per se are equally out of scope.

Risk assessment

CATSA would be required to conduct a risk assessment every five years, beginning in 2028, to identify and assess risks to information, equipment, information technology infrastructure, facilities and all other assets related to screening operations. Unlike the initial risk assessment, the ongoing risk assessment would be conducted in-house. According to subject matter experts at CATSA, it would take five days to conduct a full risk assessment and would involve two senior risk officers,^{footnote 8} resulting in a cost of $4,324 over the 15-year analytical time frame.

Review of risk assessment

CATSA would be required to conduct a review of the risk assessment on a yearly basis, starting in 2024. According to subject matter experts at CATSA, it is expected that the yearly review of the risk assessment would take three days and would involve two senior risk officers^{footnote 8}, resulting in a total cost of $16,874 over the 15-year analytical time frame.

Amendment of the security program

CATSA would be required to amend its security program (which consists of a security awareness program, risk assessment, strategic security plan, and a process to respond to security incidents) if it identifies a new risk that has not been addressed by the program. Based on consultations with CATSA, CATSA would need to amend the security program once every five years, beginning in 2026. Amending the security program is estimated to cost a quarter of the initial security program development, resulting in an incremental present value cost of $71,340 to CATSA.

Approval cost

CATSA would be required to document the process and the reasons for the amendments of the Security Program and submit the risk assessment and the strategic security plan to the Minister of Transport for approval initially and following any amendments. Based on stakeholder consultations with CATSA, it is expected that the initial submission for approval, in 2022, would take seven days and one senior risk officer.^{footnote 8} Subsequent approval submissions would occur every five years, beginning in 2026. This is expected to take one day for two senior risk officers. This would result in an incremental cost of $3,642 to CATSA.

Costs to the Government — International standards

Transport Canada would be required to review and approve documentation. It is expected that the initial approval, in 2022, would require five days' work for various employees.^{footnote 9} Subsequent approvals would occur every five years, beginning in 2026, and would require two days each.^{footnote 10} This would result in an incremental cost of $4,256 to the Government of Canada.

Cost-benefit statement

• Number of years: 15 (2021–2035)
• Base year for costing, in Canadian dollars: 2019
• Present value base year: 2020
• Discount rate: 7%

Table 1: Monetized costs

Impacted stakeholder	Description of cost	Base year (2021)	Other relevant years (2022–2034)	Final year (2035)	Total (present value)	Annualized value
Government	Review and approval	$529	$4,525	$0.00	$5,054	$555
Industry CATSA	Submitting documents for approval	$502	$3,898	$0.00	$4,400	$483
	Locked checked baggage (training and purchasing tools)	$236,947	$421,788	$19,572	$678,307	$74,475
	Introducing security measures and use of force training cost (excluding approval)	$0.00	$91,594	$943	$92,538	$10,160
All stakeholders	Total costs	$237,979	$521,805	$20,515	$780,299	$85,673

Table 2: Monetized benefits

Impacted stakeholder	Description of benefit	Base year (2021)	Other relevant years (2022–2034)	Final year (2035)	Total (present value)	Annualized value
Industry air carrier	Transfer of responsibility for cutting locks and seals on checked baggage from air carriers to CATSA	$731,552	$16,825,173	$1,036,120	$18,592,845	$2,041,394
Industry airports	Reducing reprinted RAICs	$115,489	$2,135,988	$121,655	$2,373,132	$260,557
All stakeholders	Total benefits	$847,041	$18,961,161	$1,157,775	$20,965,977	$2,301,951

Table 3: Summary of monetized costs and benefits

Impacts	Base year (2021)	Other relevant years (2022–2034)	Final year (2035)	Total (present value)	Annualized value
Total costs	$237,979	$521,805	$20,515	$780,299	$85,673
Total benefits	$847,041	$18,961,161	$1,157,775	$20,965,977	$2,301,951
NET IMPACT	$609,063	$18,439,356	$1,137,259	$20,185,678	$2,216,279

Sensitivity analysis

A number of assumptions have been made to estimate the costs of the proposed amendments. To address the effect of uncertainty and variability on these assumptions, a sensitivity analysis is conducted, where variables are assigned different values and outcomes are reevaluated. A sensitivity analysis was performed on the following variables: analytical time frame and discount rates.

Analytical time frame

A 15-year analytical time frame was used for the central analysis, whereas the sensitivity analysis presents the results should a 10-year or 20-year time frame have been used.

Discount rate

The central analysis used a 7% discount rate as recommended by the Treasury Board Secretariat. The sensitivity analysis presents the results should a 3% discount rate have been used, as well as if there was no discounting.

Table 4: Sensitivity analysis (present value in 2019 Canadian dollars, in millions)

NONBREAKING_SPACEParameter	Total benefits	Total cost	Net benefit
Analytical time frame
10 years	$14.74	$0.63	$14.11
15 years table b4 note a	$20.96	$0.78	$20.18
20 years	$26.39	$0.89	$25.50
Discount rates
Undiscounted	$36.82	$1.19	$35.63
3%	$28.51	$0.98	$27.53
7%*	$20.96	$0.78	$20.18
Table b4 note(s) Table b4 note a Central scenario used in the main analysis. Return to table b4 note a referrer

Small business lens

The small business lens does not apply, as there are no associated impacts on small businesses. The proposed amendments would mainly impact CATSA, which is a crown corporation. While some amendments would impact air carriers and operators of aerodromes, these stakeholders do not meet the definition of a small business.

One-for-one rule

The one-for-one rule does not apply, as there is no incremental change in administrative burden on business.

In accordance with the TBS Policy on Limiting Regulatory Burden on Business, the one-for-one rule is applicable to the administrative burden imposed on Canadian businesses that arises from federal regulations. Although a record-keeping requirement is considered an administrative burden, since all operators of aerodromes that have a RAIC program already keep records, the proposed amendments would not result in an incremental change in administrative burden and, therefore, would not trigger the one-for-one rule. While the proposed amendments would impose record-keeping requirements on CATSA, CATSA is a crown corporation and, therefore, not treated as a business for the purposes of the rule.

Regulatory cooperation and alignment

Third-party reports and independent audits have called on Canada to further harmonize its regulations with the ICAO Annex 17. This regulatory proposal includes provisions that would ensure that Canada meets new ICAO standards and remains in good standing on the international stage.

Strategic environmental assessment

In accordance with the Cabinet Directive on the Environmental Assessment of Policy, Plan and Program Proposals, a preliminary scan concluded that a strategic environmental assessment is not required.

Gender-based analysis plus (GBA+)

The proposed amendments are not expected to have differential impacts based on identity factors such as gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, etc.

However, the proposed amendments are expected to help mitigate potential differential impacts on members of the LGBTQ+ community. The proposed amendments would remove all references to gender from the identity screening requirements. It is expected that transgender and gender-diverse persons would benefit from this change, as they would no longer face a risk of having the gender listed on their identification documents questioned. This amendment would also align with the federal government's commitment to respect gender identity, diversity and inclusivity and support the spirit of the Policy Direction to Modernize the Government of Canada's Sex and Gender Information Practices.

Implementation, compliance and enforcement, and service standards

Implementation

All of the proposed amendments would come into force on the day they are published in the Canada Gazette, Part II, with the exception of the provisions related to the aviation security program which would come into force on January 1, 2023. A delayed coming into force would allow sufficient time for CATSA to develop its program, adjust its standard operation procedures and train screening officers to perform the related tasks.

Compliance and enforcement

Compliance is verified through oversight inspections carried out by TC. Since the main goal of oversight is to bring a stakeholder into compliance, a range of compliance and enforcement tools are available depending on the severity and frequency of non-compliance incidents. This includes working with stakeholders on means to comply with requirements through awareness and education, which may include guidance material and outreach activities with stakeholders. Transport Canada also works with stakeholders to review submissions of corrective action plans to address areas where non-compliance is identified through oversight activities.

The proposed amendments to the CASR 2012 would result in certain provisions being designated in order to authorize TC inspectors to issue administrative monetary penalties for violations of these provisions. More than half of the new provisions would be for the new Security Program requirements and the remaining ones would be for screening officer qualifications, certifications, training and examination; instructor qualifications; CATSA's authority to use force to open checked bags that are locked or sealed; and for screening equipment and software that is new, tested or modified. Under the Aeronautics Act, the maximum monetary penalty that could be assessed is $5,000 for an individual who does not comply with the locked checked baggage provisions and who discloses security-sensitive information. For CATSA, non-compliance with the remaining new provisions would result in a maximum monetary penalty of $25,000. Monetary penalties for the contravention of designated provisions helps ensure that affected stakeholders (screening officers or CATSA) comply with the regulated requirements. The assessment of a monetary penalty by the Minister of Transport can be appealed to the Transportation Appeal Tribunal of Canada.

Contact

Francine Massicotte
Chief
Security Screening
Aviation Security, Program Development
Transport Canada
112 Kent Street, 20th Floor, Tower B
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0W8
Email: francine.massicotte@tc.gc.ca

PROPOSED REGULATORY TEXT

Notice is given that the Administrator in Council, pursuant to section 4.71^{footnote a} and paragraphs 7.6(1)(a)^{footnote b} and (b)^{footnote c} of the Aeronautics Act^{footnote d}, proposes to make the annexed Regulations Amending the Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012 (Various Amendments).

Interested persons may make representations concerning the proposed Regulations to the Minister of Transport within 30 days after the date of publication of this notice. All such representations must cite the Canada Gazette, Part I, and the date of publication of this notice, and be addressed to Francine Massicotte, Chief, Security Screening, Program Development, Aviation Security, Department of Transport, Place de Ville, Tower B, 112 Kent Street, 20th Floor, Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0W8 (tel.: 613‑971‑2259; email: francine.massicotte@tc.gc.ca).

Ottawa, June 3, 2021

Julie Adair
Assistant Clerk of the Privy Council

Regulations Amending the Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012 (Various Amendments)

Amendments

1 Paragraph 2(b) of the Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012^{footnote 11} is replaced by the following:

• (b) Part 2 deals with the CATSA security program;

2 The definition screening authority in section 3 of the Regulations is replaced by the following:

screening authority means, as the context requires,

• (a) CATSA;
• (b) a screening contractor as defined in section 2 of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority Act; or
• (c) a screening officer. (administration de contrôle)

3 Section 5 of the Regulations and the heading before it are replaced by the following:

Application

Application

4.1 This Part applies in respect of aerodromes listed in the schedule to the CATSA Aerodrome Designation Regulations and in respect of any other place designated by the Minister under subsection 6(1.1) of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority Act.

Screening Officers

Qualifications

5 (1) A screening authority must not permit a screening officer to screen persons or goods unless the screening officer

• (a) is at least 18 years of age;
• (b) is a Canadian citizen or a permanent resident as defined in subsection 2(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act;
• (c) is able to communicate effectively both orally and in writing in one or both official languages;
• (d) has a security clearance;
• (e) has taken the training referred to in section 20 and, if applicable, the ongoing training referred to in section 23;
• (f) has successfully completed the evaluation in accordance with section 22 and, if applicable, subsection 23(4), demonstrating their competence in the carrying out of their screening duties;
• (g) is certified by the screening authority as meeting the requirements referred to in paragraphs (a) to (f); and
• (h) is designated by the Minister under section 4.84 of the Act.

Supervision

(2) The screening authority must ensure that any person who acts or will act as a screening officer for it or on its behalf meets the requirements set out in subsection (1).

Requalification — absence of more than a month

(3) If the screening officer is absent from work for more than one month but less than 18 months, the screening authority must ensure that, before the screening officer resumes their duties, the screening officer is evaluated and takes any necessary training on the training elements set out in section 20 to ensure their competency.

Requalification — absence of 18 months or more

(4) If the screening officer is absent from work for 18 months or more, the screening authority must ensure that the screening officer takes the training referred to in section 20 and is then evaluated to ensure their competency before they resume their duties.

Cancellation of certification

5.1 (1) The screening authority must cancel the certification granted to a person in accordance with paragraph 5(1)(g) if

• (a) the person ceases to be employed as a screening officer;
• (b) the person no longer meets the requirements set out in section 5 to conduct screening; or
• (c) the person's designation is cancelled by the Minister.

Notice to Minister

(2) The screening authority must notify the Minister when a screening officer's certification is cancelled under paragraph (1)(a) or (b).

Corrective actions

5.2 (1) The screening authority must take corrective actions if a screening officer is unable to carry out their screening duties effectively.

Plan

(2) The corrective actions must include a plan that addresses any screening deficiencies.

Evaluation

(3) The screening authority must evaluate the screening officer to ensure the screening officer's competency to carry out their duties effectively before they resume their duties.

Record

5.3 (1) The screening authority must create a training and certification record for each screening officer and make it available to the Minister on reasonable notice given by the Minister.

Record keeping

(2) The screening authority must keep the records for at least 90 days after the day on which the screening officer ceases to be employed.

4 Sections 8.1 to 8.3 of the Regulations are replaced by the following:

Definition of required identification

8.2 (1) For the purposes of sections 8.3 and 8.4, required identification means

• (a) one piece of valid government-issued photo identification that shows the holder's name and date of birth;
• (b) two pieces of valid government-issued identification, at least one of which shows the holder's name and date of birth; or
• (c) a restricted area identity card.

Exclusion

(2) A document issued by a government for the purposes of fishing, hunting or boating is not required identification.

Identity screening — age

8.3 (1) A screening authority must not allow a person to pass beyond a passenger screening checkpoint into a sterile area unless the screening authority screens the person, in accordance with these Regulations and any applicable security measure, emergency direction or interim order, by looking at the person, and in particular their entire face, to determine if they appear to be 18 years of age or older.

Identity screening — required identification

(2) A screening authority must not allow a person referred to in subsection (1) who appears to be 18 years of age or older to pass beyond a passenger screening checkpoint into a sterile area unless the screening authority screens the person

• (a) by comparing the person, and in particular their entire face, against the required identification, if applicable; and
• (b) by comparing the name on the person's document of entitlement with the name on the required identification.

5 The portion of subsection 8.4(1) of the Regulations before paragraph (a) is replaced by the following:

Lost or stolen identification

8.4 (1) If a person referred to in subsection 8.3(1) who appears to be 18 years of age or older presents documentation that is issued by a government or a police service and that attests to the loss or theft of the required identification, a screening authority must not allow the person to pass beyond a passenger screening checkpoint into a sterile area unless the screening authority

6 (1) Subsection 8.5(1) of the Regulations is replaced by the following:

Refusal of entry

8.5 (1) A screening authority must not allow a person referred to in subsection 8.3(1) who appears to be 18 years of age or older to pass beyond a passenger screening checkpoint into a sterile area if

• (a) the person presents a piece of photo identification and does not resemble the photograph;
• (b) the person presents more than one form of identification and there is a significant discrepancy between those forms of identification; or
• (c) there is a significant discrepancy between the name on the identification presented by the person and the name on their document of entitlement.

(2) T he portion of subsection 8.5(2) of the Regulations before paragraph (a) is replaced by the following:

Medical exceptions

(2) Paragraph (1)(a) does not apply in respect of a person referred to in subsection 8.3(1) if

7 Section 9 of the Regulations is repealed.

8 S ection 13 of the Regulations is repealed.

9 The Regulations are amended by adding the following after section 14:

Screening of Checked Baggage

Use of force

14.1 If a piece of checked baggage is locked or sealed, a screening authority is authorized to use force when it is necessary to gain access to the contents of the piece of checked baggage for the purposes of screening.

Notice

14.2 (1) When a screening authority uses force to gain access to the contents of a piece of checked baggage that is being screened, the screening authority must notify the person who tendered the checked baggage that it was opened by force.

Record

(2) The screening authority must create a record of each instance in which force is used to gain access to the contents of a piece of checked baggage that is being screened.

Record keeping

(3) The screening authority must keep the record for at least 180 days.

Provision of record to Minister

(4) The screening authority must provide the record to the Minister on reasonable notice given by the Minister.

10 The reference “[18 to 54 reserved]” after section 17 of the Regulations is replaced by the following:

[18 and 19 reserved]

Training

Minimum training standards

20 (1) A screening authority must establish and implement in a consistent manner across Canada a training program for screening officers. The training program must be composed of both theoretical and practical training and

• (a) cover the responsibilities and duties of a screening officer, as well as screening processes;
• (b) cover the safeguarding of civil aviation operations against acts of unlawful interference, as well as current and emerging aviation security threats and trends;
• (c) cover the use of screening equipment, and include practical training using the screening equipment; and
• (d) include on-the-job training provided and supervised by a person who has knowledge of and experience in screening.

Qualifications of instructor

21 The screening authority must ensure that an instructor who provides the training referred to in paragraphs 20(a) to (d)

• (a) is at least 18 years of age;
• (b) is a Canadian citizen or a permanent resident as defined in subsection 2(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act;
• (c) has a security clearance;
• (d) has specialized knowledge of aviation security screening operations;
• (e) has successfully completed instructor training on aviation security and the screening elements to be taught; and
• (f) has knowledge of current and emerging aviation security threats and trends and of regulatory requirements related to screening.

Evaluation

22 (1) The screening authority must evaluate a screening officer candidate who has taken the training referred to in section 20 based on the following criteria:

• (a) knowledge of the elements referred to in paragraphs 20(a) and (b); and
• (b) the ability to operate screening equipment and apply the screening processes for persons and goods.

Evaluation — X-ray equipment

(2) If the screening is to be carried out using X-ray equipment, the evaluation referred to in paragraph (1)(b) must contain an X-ray component that includes

• (a) the screening of goods that are listed or described in the general list of prohibited items, with an emphasis on explosive substances;
• (b) the screening of goods that are arranged in a way that creates various levels of difficulty in identifying them; and
• (c) the use of X-ray image enhancement tools.

Ongoing training program

23 (1) In order for a screening officer to maintain their knowledge and skills, the screening authority must have an ongoing training program that

• (a) covers changes in screening processes, screening equipment and aviation security threats and trends; and
• (b) includes a review of any screening issues and gaps.

Frequency

(2) The program must set out the frequency of ongoing training.

Qualified instructor

(3) The ongoing training must be provided by an instructor who meets the requirements set out in section 21.

Evaluation

(4) The screening authority must evaluate the knowledge and skills of the screening officer as soon as feasible.

Program and examinations

24 The screening authority must provide the Minister, on reasonable notice given by the Minister, with its screening officer training program and the examinations used for evaluations.

[25 to 29 reserved]

Screening Equipment

Screening equipment

30 (1) A screening authority must obtain the Minister's approval before implementing any of the following measures:

• (a) the use, on a trial basis, of new screening equipment or software;
• (b) the modification of approved screening equipment or software; or
• (c) the addition of new screening equipment or software.

Request for approval

(2) The screening authority must include the following information in the request for approval for the purposes of subsection (1):

• (a) the reasons for the implementation of the measures and any supporting documentation from the manufacturer;
• (b) a description of any proposed modifications to approved screening equipment or software;
• (c) a list of the performance verification tools approved by the Minister that will be used; and
• (d) documentation demonstrating that the detection performance of any modified equipment is maintained or enhanced.

Process — protection of sensitive information

31 (1) A screening authority must implement and maintain a process approved by the Minister for preventing the disclosure of sensitive information respecting aviation security when screening equipment or software is sold, destroyed or otherwise disposed of.

Amendment of process

(2) If the screening authority intends to amend the process, it must obtain the approval of the Minister before implementing the amended process.

[32 to 55 reserved]

11 The headings before section 55 of the Regulations and section 55 are repealed.

12 Subections 63(1) to (3) of the Regulations are replaced by the following:

Business continuity plan

63 (1) CATSA must develop and maintain a business continuity plan — to be implemented in the event that it is unable to use the identity verification system — that sets out

• (a) how CATSA will maintain an equivalent level of security until normal operations are re-established, including the ability to meet the following objectives:
  • (i) to receive security clearance information from the Minister,
  • (ii) to activate and deactivate restricted area identity cards, and
  • (iii) to allow the operator of an aerodrome to verify that a restricted area identity card is active or has been deactivated; and
• (b) how CATSA will re-establish normal operations.

Implementation

(2) CATSA must implement its business continuity plan and immediately notify the Minister and any affected operator of an aerodrome if it discovers that it is unable to use the identity verification system for the operations set out in subparagraphs (1)(a)(i) to (iii).

Delay notice

(3) CATSA must immediately notify the Minister and any affected operator of an aerodrome if it discovers that it will be unable, for more than 24 hours, to use the identity verification system for the operations set out in subparagraphs (1)(a)(i) to (iii) and must immediately inform the Minister and any affected operator of an aerodrome of how it will re-establish normal operations.

13 Subsection 64(1) of the Regulations is amended by striking out "and" after paragraph (e), by adding "and" after paragraph (d) and by repealing paragraph (f).

14 The reference “[65 to 75 reserved]” after section 64 of the Regulations is replaced by the following:

PART 2
CATSA Security Program

CATSA Security Program Requirements

Requirement to establish and implement

65 (1) CATSA must establish and implement a security program in order to safeguard information, equipment, information technology infrastructure, facilities and all other assets related to screening operations.

Program requirements

(2) As part of its security program, CATSA must

• (a) develop a security policy statement that establishes an overall security commitment and direction and sets out the security objectives;
• (b) establish and implement a security awareness program that promotes a culture of vigilance among its employees;
• (c) conduct a security risk assessment in accordance with section 69;
• (d) assess risk information and disseminate it within its organization for the purpose of facilitating informed decision-making about security;
• (e) establish a strategic security plan in accordance with section 73;
• (f) identify the security official referred to in subsection (3);
• (g) subject to section 31, establish and implement a process for receiving, identifying, retaining, disclosing and disposing of sensitive information respecting aviation security in order to protect the information from unauthorized access; and
• (h) establish and implement a process for responding to security incidents and breaches.

Security official

(3) CATSA must have, at all times, at least one security official or acting security official who is responsible for acting as the principal contact between CATSA and the Minister with respect to the security program.

Documentation

66 (1) CATSA must keep

• (a) documentation related to its security risk assessment and any review of it for at least five years;
• (b) documentation related to its strategic security plan and any amendment to it for at least five years; and
• (c) all other documentation related to its security program for at least two years.

Ministerial access

(2) CATSA must make the documentation available to the Minister on reasonable notice given by the Minister.

Requirement to amend

67 CATSA must amend its security program if it identifies a security risk that is not addressed by the program.

Committees

Multi-agency advisory committee

68 CATSA must be an active member of an aerodrome's multi-agency advisory committee referred to in sections 196 and 353.

Security Risk Assessments

Security risk assessments

69 CATSA must have a security risk assessment that identifies and assesses the risks in respect of information, equipment, information technology infrastructure, facilities and all other assets related to screening operations and that includes the following elements:

• (a) a threat assessment that evaluates the probability of a disruption to security screening services caused by an unauthorized access or an act or attempted act of unlawful interference;
• (b) a criticality assessment that prioritizes the information, equipment, information technology infrastructure, facilities and all other assets related to screening operations that most require protection from acts and attempted acts of unlawful interference;
• (c) a vulnerability assessment that considers the extent to which information, equipment, information technology infrastructure, facilities and all other assets related to screening operations are susceptible to loss or damage; and
• (d) an impact assessment that, at a minimum, measures the consequences of a security screening incident or potential security screening incident in terms of
  • (i) a decrease in public safety and security,
  • (ii) financial and economic loss, and
  • (iii) a loss of public confidence.

Submission for approval

70 (1) CATSA must submit its initial security risk assessment to the Minister for approval.

Submission — five years

(2) CATSA must submit a new security risk assessment to the Minister within five years after the date of the most recent approval.

Security risk assessment — annual review

71 (1) CATSA must conduct a review of its security risk assessment at least once a year.

Security risk assessment — other reviews

(2) CATSA must also conduct a review of its security risk assessment if

• (a) it acquires new equipment, information technology infrastructure, facilities or any other new assets related to screening operations;
• (b) it makes changes to security screening operations that could affect information, equipment, information technology infrastructure, facilities or any other assets related to screening operations;
• (c) a change in regulatory requirements could affect information, equipment, information technology infrastructure, facilities or any other assets related to screening operations; or
• (d) it identifies a vulnerability that is not addressed in the assessment or the Minister identifies such a vulnerability to CATSA.

Equivalency

(3) For greater certainty, a review conducted under subsection (2) counts as a review required under subsection (1).

Documentation

(4) When CATSA conducts a review of its security risk assessment, it must document

• (a) any decision to amend or to not amend the assessment or the risk-management strategy;
• (b) the reasons for that decision; and
• (c) the factors that were taken into consideration in making that decision.

Notification

(5) CATSA must notify the Minister if, as a result of a review of its security risk assessment, it amends the assessment

• (a) to include a new medium to high risk; or
• (b) to raise or lower the level of a risk within the medium to high range.

Approval

72 The Minister must approve a security risk assessment submitted by CATSA if

• (a) the assessment meets the requirements of section 69;
• (b) the assessment has been reviewed by an executive within CATSA who is responsible for security;
• (c) CATSA has considered all available and relevant information; and
• (d) CATSA has not overlooked a security risk that could compromise information, equipment, information technology infrastructure, facilities or any other assets related to screening operations.

Strategic Security Plans

Strategic security plans

73 (1) CATSA must establish a strategic security plan that

• (a) summarizes its strategy to prepare for, detect, prevent, respond to and recover from threats identified in the security risk assessment; and
• (b) includes a risk-management strategy that addresses the medium to high security risks identified and prioritized in its security risk assessment.

Submission for approval

(2) CATSA must submit its strategic security plan to the Minister for approval.

Approval of plan

(3) The Minister must approve a strategic security plan submitted by CATSA if

• (a) the plan meets the requirements of subsection (1);
• (b) the plan has been reviewed by an executive within CATSA who is responsible for security;
• (c) the plan is likely to enable CATSA to prepare for, detect, prevent, respond to and recover from an unauthorized access to or acts or attempted acts of unlawful interference with information, equipment, information technology infrastructure, facilities or any other assets related to screening operations;
• (d) the risk-management strategy is in proportion to the risks it addresses;
• (e) CATSA has not overlooked a security risk that could compromise information, equipment, information technology infrastructure, facilities or any other assets related to screening operations; and
• (f) the plan can be implemented without compromising security.

Implementation

(4) CATSA must, as soon as its strategic security plan is approved, implement its risk-management strategy.

Amendments

74 (1) CATSA may amend its strategic security plan at any time, but must do so if

• (a) the plan does not reflect CATSA's most recent security risk assessment;
• (b) the Minister informs CATSA that there is a change in the threat environment that could result in a new or unaddressed medium to high risk to information, equipment, information technology infrastructure, facilities or any other assets related to screening operations;
• (c) CATSA identifies a deficiency in the plan; or
• (d) the Minister informs CATSA that its risk-management strategy is not in proportion to a risk set out in its security risk assessment.

Documentation

(2) If CATSA amends its strategic security plan, it must document

• (a) the reason for the amendment; and
• (b) the factors that were taken into consideration in making that amendment.

Submission of amendment

(3) If CATSA amends its strategic security plan, it must, as soon as possible, submit the amendment to the Minister for approval.

Approval

(4) The Minister must approve an amendment if

• (a) in the case of an amendment to the summary required under paragraph 73(1)(a), the conditions set out in paragraphs 73(3)(a) to (c) have been met; or
• (b) in the case of an amendment to the risk-management strategy required under paragraph 73(1)(b), the conditions set out in paragraphs 73(3)(a) to (f) have been met.

Implementation

(5) If CATSA amends its risk-management strategy, it must implement the amended version of the strategy once it is approved by the Minister.

Disclosure of Information

Prohibition

75 A person other than the Minister must not disclose security-sensitive information that is created or used under this Part unless the disclosure is required by law or is necessary to comply or facilitate compliance with the aviation security provisions of the Act, regulatory requirements or the requirements of an emergency direction.

15 (1) Paragraph 145(1)(b) of the Regulations is repealed.

(2) Paragraphs 145(1)(h) and (i) of the Regulations are repealed.

(3) Subsection 145(2) of the Regulations is replaced by the following:

Expiration date

(2) A restricted area identity card, including one that is issued to a person who requires access to restricted areas at more than one aerodrome, expires no later than five years after the day on which it is issued or on the day on which the security clearance of the person to whom the card is issued expires, whichever is earlier.

(4) Subsection 145(3) of the Regulations is repealed.

16 Section 158 of the Regulations is amended by adding the following after subsection (2):

Destruction of cards

(3) The operator of an aerodrome must, as soon as feasible, destroy a restricted area identity card that has been retrieved or returned.

17 Subsection 163(1) of the Regulations is amended by striking out “and” at the end of paragraph (i), by adding “and” at the end of paragraph (j) and by adding the following after paragraph (j):

• (k) restricted area identity cards that have been destroyed.

18 Subsection 169(2) of the Regulations is replaced by the following:

Implementation

(2) The operator of the aerodrome must implement its business continuity plan and immediately notify the Minister and CATSA if the operator discovers that it is unable to use its restricted area access control process to comply with section 168.

19 (1) Paragraph 301(1)(b) of the Regulations is repealed.

(2) Paragraphs 301(1)(h) and (i) of the Regulations are repealed.

(3) Subsection 301(2) of the Regulations is replaced by the following:

Expiration date

(2) A restricted area identity card, including one that is issued to a person who requires access to restricted areas at more than one aerodrome, expires no later than five years after the day on which it is issued or on the day on which the security clearance of the person to whom the card is issued expires, whichever is earlier.

(4) Subsection 301(3) of the Regulations is repealed.

20 Section 314 of the Regulations is amended by adding the following after subsection (2):

Destruction of cards

(3) The operator of an aerodrome must, as soon as feasible, destroy a restricted area identity card that has been retrieved or returned.

21 Subsection 319(1) of the Regulations is amended by striking out “and” at the end of paragraph (i), by adding “and” at the end of paragraph (j) and by adding the following after paragraph (j):

• (k) restricted area identity cards that have been destroyed.

22 Subsection 325(2) of the Regulations is replaced by the following:

Implementation

(2) The operator of the aerodrome must implement its business continuity plan and immediately notify the Minister and CATSA if the operator discovers that it is unable to use its restricted area access control process to comply with section 324.

23 (1) Paragraph 452.03(1)(b) of the Regulations is repealed.

(2) Paragraphs 452.03(1)(h) and (i) of the Regulations are repealed.

(3) Subsection 452.03(2) of the Regulations is replaced by the following:

Expiration date

(2) A restricted area identity card, including one that is issued to a person who requires access to restricted areas at more than one aerodrome, expires no later than five years after the day on which it is issued or on the day on which the security clearance of the person to whom the card is issued expires, whichever is earlier.

(4) Subsection 452.03(3) of the Regulations is repealed.

24 Section 452.16 of the Regulations is amended by adding the following after subsection (2):

Destruction of cards

(3) The operator of an aerodrome must, as soon as feasible, destroy a restricted area identity card that has been retrieved or returned.

25 Subsection 452.21(1) of the Regulations is amended by striking out “and” at the end of paragraph (i), by adding “and” at the end of paragraph (j) and by adding the following after paragraph (j):

• (k) restricted area identity cards that have been destroyed.

26 Subsection 452.27(2) of the Regulations is replaced by the following:

Implementation

(2) The operator of the aerodrome must implement its business continuity plan and immediately notify the Minister and CATSA if the operator discovers that it is unable to use its restricted area access control process to comply with section 452.26.

27 Schedules 1 to 3 to the Regulations are replaced by the Schedules 1 to 3 set out in the schedule to these Regulations.

28 The reference “Subsection 5(1)” in column 1 of Schedule 4 to the Regulations and the corresponding amount in columns 2 and 3 are replaced by the following:

Column 1 Designated Provision	Column 2 Maximum Amount Payable ($) Individual	Column 3 Maximum Amount Payable ($) Corporation
Subsection 5(1)		25,000

29 Schedule 4 to the Regulations is amended by adding the following after the reference “Subsection 5(2)”:

Column 1 Designated Provision	Column 2 Maximum Amount Payable ($) Individual	Column 3 Maximum Amount Payable ($) Corporation
Subsection 5(3)		25,000
Subsection 5(4)		25,000
Subsection 5.1(1)		25,000
Subsection 5.1(2)		25,000
Subsection 5.2(1)		25,000
Subsection 5.2(2)		25,000
Subsection 5.2(3)		25,000
Subsection 5.3(1)		10,000
Subsection 5.3(2)		10,000

30 The reference “Subsection 8.1(2)” in column 1 of Schedule 4 to the Regulations and the corresponding amounts in columns 2 and 3 are repealed.

31 Schedule 4 to the Regulations is amended by adding the following after the reference “Section 14”:

Column 1 Designated Provision	Column 2 Maximum Amount Payable ($) Individual	Column 3 Maximum Amount Payable ($) Corporation
Subsection 14.2(1)	5,000	25,000
Subsection 14.2(2)	5,000	25,000
Subsection 14.2(3)	5,000	25,000
Subsection 14.2(4)	5,000	25,000

32 Schedule 4 to the Regulations is amended by adding the following after the reference “Section 17”:

Column 1 Designated Provision	Column 2 Maximum Amount Payable ($) Individual	Column 3 Maximum Amount Payable ($) Corporation
Section 20		25,000
Section 21		25,000
Paragraph 22(1)(a)		25,000
Paragraph 22(1)(b)		25,000
Paragraph 22(2)(a)		25,000
Paragraph 22(2)(b)		25,000
Paragraph 22(2)(c)		25,000
Subsection 23(1)		25,000
Subsection 23(2)		25,000
Subsection 23(3)		25,000
Subsection 23(4)		25,000
Section 24		25,000
Subsection 30(1)		25,000
Subsection 31(1)		25,000
Subsection 31(2)		25,000

33 The heading before the reference “Subsection 56(1)” of Schedule 4 to the Regulations is repealed.

34 Schedule 4 to the Regulations is amended by adding the following after the reference “Subsection 64(2)”:

Column 1 Designated Provision	Column 2 Maximum Amount Payable ($) Individual	Column 3 Maximum Amount Payable ($) Corporation
PART 2 — CATSA SECURITY PROGRAM
Subsection 65(1)		25,000
Paragraph 65(2)(a)		25,000
Paragraph 65(2)(c)		25,000
Paragraph 65(2)(f)		25,000
Paragraph 65(2)(g)		25,000
Paragraph 65(2)(h)		25,000
Subsection 65(3)		25,000
Paragraph 66(1)(a)		25,000
Paragraph 66(1)(b)		25,000
Paragraph 66(1)(c)		10,000
Subsection 66(2)		25,000
Section 67		25,000
Section 68		25,000
Section 69		25,000
Subsection 70(1)		25,000
Subsection 70(2)		25,000
Subsection 71(1)		25,000
Subsection 71(2)		25,000
Subsection 71(4)		25,000
Subsection 71(5)		25,000
Subsection 73(1)		25,000
Subsection 73(2)		25,000
Subsection 73(4)		25,000
Subsection 74(1)		25,000
Subsection 74(2)		25,000
Subsection 74(3)		25,000
Subsection 74(5)		25,000
Section 75	5,000	25,000

35 Schedule 4 to the Regulations is amended by adding the following after the reference “Subsection 158(2)”:

Column 1 Designated Provision	Column 2 Maximum Amount Payable ($) Individual	Column 3 Maximum Amount Payable ($) Corporation
Subsection 158(3)		25,000

36 Schedule 4 to the Regulations is amended by adding the following after the reference “Subsection 314(2)”:

Column 1 Designated Provision	Column 2 Maximum Amount Payable ($) Individual	Column 3 Maximum Amount Payable ($) Corporation
Subsection 314(3)		25,000

37 Schedule 4 to the Regulations is amended by adding the following after the reference “Subsection 452.16(2)”:

Column 1 Designated Provision	Column 2 Maximum Amount Payable ($) Individual	Column 3 Maximum Amount Payable ($) Corporation
Subsection 452.16(3)		25,000

38 The Regulations are amended by replacing “subsection 6(1)” with “subsection 6(1.1)” in the following provisions:

• (a) paragraph 2(f);
• (b) sections 401 and 402;
• (c) sections 505 and 506;
• (d) section 508;
• (e) subsection 516(2); and
• (f) section 778.

39 The Regulations are amended by replacing “name” with “International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) location indicator” in the following provisions:

• (a) paragraph 351(1)(a);
• (b) paragraphs 352(1)(a), (2)(a) and (3)(a);
• (c) paragraph 459(1)(a); and
• (d) paragraphs 460(1)(a) and (2)(a).

Coming into Force

40 (1) Subject to subsection (2), these Regulations come into force on the day on which they are published in the Canada Gazette, Part II.

(2) Sections 14 and 34 come into force on January 1, 2023.

SCHEDULE

(Section 27)

SCHEDULE 1

(Paragraph 2(d), sections 6, 82, 83, 117, 273, 428, 505, 506 and 508, subsection 516(1) and section 778)

Class 1 Aerodromes

Column 1 Location	Column 2 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Location Indicator
Calgary	CYYC
Edmonton	CYEG
Halifax	CYHZ
Montréal	CYMX, CYUL
Ottawa	CYOW
Toronto	CYYZ
Vancouver	CYVR
Winnipeg	CYWG

SCHEDULE 2

(Paragraph 2(e), sections 246, 247 and 273, paragraph 351(1)(a), subsection 351(2), paragraphs 352(1)(a), (2)(a) and 3(a), sections 428, 505, 506 and 508, subsection 516(1) and section 778)

Class 2 Aerodromes

Column 1 Location	Column 2 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Location Indicator
Charlottetown	CYYG
Fredericton	CYFC
Gander	CYQX
Iqaluit	CYFB
Kelowna	CYLW
London	CYXU
Moncton	CYQM
Prince George	CYXS
Québec	CYQB
Regina	CYQR
Saint John	CYSJ
St. John's	CYYT
Saskatoon	CYXE
Sudbury	CYSB
Thunder Bay	CYQT
Toronto	CYTZ
Victoria	CYYJ
Whitehorse	CYXY
Windsor	CYQG
Yellowknife	CYZF

SCHEDULE 3

(Paragraph 2(f), sections 401, 402 and 428, paragraph 459(1)(a), subsection 459(2), paragraphs 460(1)(a) and (2)(a), sections 505, 506 and 508, subsection 516(1) and section 778)

Class 3 Aerodromes

Column 1 Location	Column 2 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Location Indicator
Abbotsford	CYXX
Alma	CYTF
Bagotville	CYBG
Baie-Comeau	CYBC
Bathurst	CZBF
Brandon	CYBR
Campbell River	CYBL
Castlegar	CYCG
Charlo	CYCL
Chibougamau/Chapais	CYMT
Churchill Falls	CZUM
Comox	CYQQ
Cranbrook	CYXC
Dawson Creek	CYDQ
Deer Lake	CYDF
Fort McMurray	CYMM
Fort St. John	CYXJ
Gaspé	CYGP
Goose Bay	CYYR
Grande Prairie	CYQU
Hamilton	CYHM
Îles-de-la-Madeleine	CYGR
Kamloops	CYKA
Kingston	CYGK
Kitchener/Waterloo	CYKF
Kuujjuaq	CYVP
Kuujjuarapik	CYGW
La Grande Rivière	CYGL
La Macaza / Mont-Tremblant	CYFJ
Lethbridge	CYQL
Lloydminster	CYLL
Lourdes-de-Blanc-Sablon	CYBX
Medicine Hat	CYXH
Mont-Joli	CYYY
Nanaimo	CYCD
North Bay	CYYB
Penticton	CYYF
Prince Albert	CYPA
Prince Rupert	CYPR
Quesnel	CYQZ
Red Deer	CYQF
Roberval	CYRJ
Rouyn-Noranda	CYUY
St. Anthony	CYAY
Saint-Léonard	CYSL
Sandspit	CYZP
Sarnia	CYZR
Sault Ste. Marie	CYAM
Sept-Îles	CYZV
Smithers	CYYD
Stephenville	CYJT
Sydney	CYQY
Terrace	CYXT
Thompson	CYTH
Timmins	CYTS
Toronto	CYKZ
Val-d'Or	CYVO
Wabush	CYWK
Williams Lake	CYWL
Yarmouth	CYQI